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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17619

JAMES E. BALLENBERGER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict of guilty
of the offense of Theft, in violation of § 76-6-404 and
§

76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.

The

charge was based on appellant's exercise of unauthorized
control over the property of another with intent to deprive
him of his property.

The property stolen was of a value

exceeding $1,000 and thus a second-degree felony sentence was
imposed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the outset of the trial, the court held an
evident iary hearing on the appellant's Motion to Suppress
~idence

(T. 81).

Appellant claimed that the evidence should

have been excluded since his initial detention by the officer
constituted an unlawful arrest; thus, evidence subsequently
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

obtained was inadmissible.

The trial court denied the motion

(T. 86), holding that appellant was not unlawfully arrested
and that subsequent evidence was not unconstitutionally
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The case was tried on the 28th and 29th of January,
1981, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding.

The

appellant was convicted by a jury of theft, a second-degree
felony, in that the value of the property exceeded $1,000.
The trial court also denied appellant's motion to
dismiss, stating that the issues raised were questions of
credibility which were properly left to the jury as triers of
fact (T. 157).
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison on
March 5, 1981 to serve an indeterminate term of from one to 15 ,
years as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of:

1) the jury

verdict of guilt rendered in the trial court; 2) the trial
court's denial of appellant's Motion to Suppress; and 3) the
trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss for lack
of sufficient evidence.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 15, 1980, Officer Ray Levitre was engaged in
routine patrol when he noticed a vehicle heading eastbound on
the Highland Dairy access road (T. 26, 123).
~mber

Due to the large

of burglaries which had recently occurred in the area,

the officer had been requested to increase his patrol and
identify anyone stopped in the area (T. 40, 43).
As the car came within viewing distance of Officer
~Vitre's

car it made a sudden turn into the parking lot of

the Oakwood business district and went behind a row of
buildings located there (T. 28, 29, 124).

Officer Levitre

backed up about 100 yards and waited to see if the car was
going to re-emerge from behind the buildings (T. 30, 125,
126).

When the car failed to re-emerge, Officer Levitre

called for assistance and went to investigate (T. 31, 127).
He arrived where the vehicle was located and noted
that the area was well lit (T. 32), and that the appellant was
standing in front of the vehicle with the hood up and the
engine off (T. 32, 33, 127).

The officer then pulled his car

alongside the passenger side of the other vehicle and asked if
t~re was a problem (T.

33, 43, 52, 128), to which the

appellant replied that they were checking the oil.

The

officer then left his vehicle and approached the other car
a~ing

the appellant and his companion for identification (T.

34, 130).

The appellant had none (T. 145).
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As Officer Levitre approached the other vehicle he
noticed in the back seat, in plain view, stereo equipment and
other property (T. 35, 128).

He asked appellant who the

property belonged to just as Officer Hansen was arriving (T.
36, 131).

He then asked Officer Hansen to take the appellant

to his vehicle and question him about the. property and th;
circumstances of their presence in the area at 3: 30 in the
morning (T. 37, 131).
Officer Hansen then placed the appellant in his
patrol c;ar, gave him Miranda warnings, and questioned him (T.
38).

The appellant told Officer Hansen that he had bought the

property from a third-party friend of Lynn Fulton (11ho was the
other person in the car) whom he could not identify (T. 45,
141).

Officer Hansen told this to Officer Levitre, who had

received a different story from Lynn Fulton (T. 41, 71).
Officer Levitre then confronted Fulton with the inconsistency
of his and appellant's stories.

Fulton told Officer Levitre

he had lied and the property had really come from a van which
was located nearby (T. 45).

Officer Levitre and Lynn Fulton

then went to the place where the van was located, found the
owner, and returned to the scene where the property was
identified as belonging to Robby Ashby (T. 46, 132).
The appellant and Lynn Fulton were then placed
under arrest (T. 46).

The car was towed to the Murray police

station and then seized (T. 39).

-4-
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At trial appellant made a motion to suppress the
evidence claiming that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal
arrest (T. 81).

The trial court determined that the arrest

did not occur until probable cause existed and therefore
denied the motion to suppress (T. 86).

At the end of the

state's case the appellant made a motion to dismiss (T. 145),
c~iming

that value had not been established and that failure

~produce

146).

the tools constituted a denial of due process (T.

The trial court denied this motion stating that the

issues presented were questions of credibility which should
properly be decided by the jury (T. 157).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL INQUIRY OF APPELLANT WAS
PERMISSIBLE AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARREST WAS
NOT ILLEGAL.
Appellant contends that the initial questioning of
appellant and Lynn Fulton was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in that the
officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that they were
engaged in criminal conduct.

He also contends that the

subsequent arrest was unconstitutional since it was not based
on probable cause.

Both of these contentions are without

merit when viewed in light of all the circumstances.

Officer

-5-
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LeVirtre was justified in making the initial inquiry and
questioning of the appellant and his arrest was only made
after probable cause had been established.
A.

NOT ALL DETENTIONS CONSTITUTE AN
UNLAWFUL ARREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

The case of Terry v. Ohio, 392. U.S. 1 (1968), upon
which appellant relies, established that a police officer may
detain and question a person based on information which falls
short of establishing probable cause to arrest the person.
The facts of Terry are similar in many respects to the case at
bar.

There, an experienced Cleveland police officer, while

patrolling on foot, had his attention attracted to two persons
who repeatedly walked up and down a street pausing to look
into a particular store window each time they passed.

The

officer suspected that they might be "casing" the store in
contemplation of a possible robbery and thus approached the
individuals to question them.

When they gave evasive answers

the officer also frisked them for weapons.
In upholding both the stop and the frisk, the
United States Supreme Court wrote:
• • • there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search or seize
against the invasion which the search or
seizure entails . • • • And in justifying
-6-
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the particular intrusion, the police
officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.
392

u.s. 1, 21.

The Court reserved the issue, of when a

seizure would be justified for purposes of detention and/or
interrogation, Terry, supra, n. 16.

In that footnote the

Court observed:
Obviously not all personal
intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves "seizures" of persons.
Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a "seizure"
has occurred.
392 U.S. at 1,

19, n. 16.

In the present case, Officer LeVitre's initial
questioning of the appellant and his companion while they were
"checking their oil" did not constitute a sufficient show of
authority nor a restraining of their liberty to constitute a
"seizure.•

Thus, the protections of the Fourth Amendment do

not apply to this initial encounter.
This Court, in State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d
103, 105, adopted the standard of "objective credible reason"

which was used in People v. La Pene, 40 N.Y. 2d 210, 352 N.E.
2d 562 (1976) and its companion case, People v. DeBour, 352

-7-
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N.E. 2d 562 (1976).

In People v. DeBour, supra, the Court of

Appeals of New York recognized that in some circumstances

I.

police officers may approach persons to conduct a preliminary I
inquiry on facts falling short of the "reasonable
standard of Terry, supra.

suspic~n·

In DeBour, two police officers,

while walking down a street shortly after. midnight, noticed an
individual walking toward them on the same side of the street,
When the person got within thirty feet of the officers he
quickly crossed the street.

The officers also crossed and

asked the defendant what he was doing in the area and asked
for identification.

Observing a bulge under the defendant's

jacket, the officers asked him to unzip his jacket, which he
did, revealing a loaded revolver in his waistband which the
officers seized.
In holding that this conduct did not constitute a
"seizure," the Court wrote:
This case raises the fundamental
issue of whether or not a police officer,
in the absence of any concrete indication
of criminality, may approach a private
citizen on the street for the purpose of
requesting information. We hold that he
may. The basis for this inquiry need not
rest on any indication of criminal
activity on the part of the person of
whom inquiry is made but there must be
some articulable reason sufficient to
justify the police action which was
taken.
352 N.E.2d 562, 565.
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rn

the companion case, People v. La Pene, supra, the court

i~icated

how this analysis fits with the "reasonable

suspicion" standard:
We bear in mind that any
inquiry into the propriety of police
conduct must weigh the interference it
entails against the precipitating and
attending conditions.
By this approach
various intensities of police action are
justifiable as the precipitating and
attendant factors increase in weight and
competence. The minimal intrusion of
approaching to request information is
permissible when there is some objective
credible reason for that interference not
necessarily indicative of criminality
(People v. DeBour, jupra). The next
degree, the common- aw right to inquire,
is activated by a founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot and permits a
somewhat greater intrusion in that a
policeman is entitled to inferfere with a
citizen to the extent necessary to gain
explanatory information, but short of a
forcible seizure. Where a police officer
entertains a reasonable suspicion that a
particular person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a felony
or misdemeanor, this authorizes a
forcible stop and detention of that
person.
352 N.E.2d 562, 571-572.

Thus, all that is required for an

initial confrontation between police and citizens in public
places is an articulable, objective reason for the inquiry.
In the present case, Officer Levitre, aware of the
recent incidents of crime in the area, and the sudden swerve
of the automobile when the drivers saw the patrol car (T. 31,

40), was justified in initially approaching the appellant
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and his companion.

His suspicion of the defendants was fueled

by the failure to re-emerge from behind buildings which were
closed to the public and had recently been the target of
several burglaries.

He asked for identification

pursua~ ~a

police order to identify persons in the area ( T. 43).

The

appellant failed to produce identificatio~ (T. 35, 146).

At

this point the officer had seen the property located in plain
view on the back seat of the automobile (T. 19, 20) and asked
the parties to whom it belonged.

In the circumstances, this

question was reasonable and did not constitute a violation of
the appellant's rights.
In State v. Larson, Wash. App., 587 P.2d 171
{ 1978), the court applied the DeBour rationale to a factual
situation similar to the instant case.

In Larson, officers

saw several people in a car parked in a no-parking zone in a
closed park late at night in an area in which many burglaries
had recently occurred.

The officers approached the car and

asked each occupant for identification.

As the defendant

opened her purse to obtain identification, the officers saw
and seized a bag of marijuana from the purse.

In upholdi~

the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
this evidence, the court stated:
While the presence of individuals
wandering abroad late at night or at an
unusual hour should not of itself
precipitate a police investigation, it is
a circumstance justifying suspicion.

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

• • • Taking it in combination with
factors such as the defendant's being
seated in a car parked in a no-parking
zone near a closed park in an area where
numerous burglaries had occurred
previously, police suspicion of illegal
conduct was justifiable. Under such
circumstances, the police may ask for
identification •
587 P.2d 171, 172-173.

See also State v. Warner, Ore., 585

P.2d 681 (1978) at 689.
Here, the initial reasonable suspicion, as in
Larson, was followed by a plain view sighting of contraband,
which does not amount to a search in the constitutional sense.
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709, 711 (1980).
Although the stereo equipment and tools located in the back
seat of the appellant's car were not immediately identified as
s~len,

they were properly seen through the window and not

discovered during the course of an unlawful search.

In light

of the high rate of crime recently reported in the area, it
was proper for the officer to ask the appellant and his
companion where the items had come from.

There is no

indication in the record that either party refused to talk
with the officers (Officer Hansen had arrived at the scene and
asked appellant, who was outside the vehicle, to answer
questions).

There is also no indication that any force or

threat of authority was used to force appellant to enter
Officer Hansen's car for questioning.
-11-
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B.

THE "ARREST" OF THE APPELLANT WAS
BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE.

Appellant contends that from the point at which he
entered Officer Hansen's car he was under arrest.

This is

contrary to the testimony of Officer Hansen (T. 140, 141, 1461
and could only be true if the appellant had indicated a de_sire
to leave and had been unable to do so.

Appellant cites the

fact that he was given his Miranda warnings to support his
contention.

This fact, however, is not determinative of the

po int in time at which an arrest is made.

Miranda warnings

are routinely given before any questioning is done to insure
that information obtained is not subsequently suppressed for
failure to give the warnings.
The conduct of Officer Hansen in questioning the
appellant was not an arrest since there was no indication that
the appellant was not free to leave or that he was in custody.
The conduct here merely constituted
of the appellant.

n

thresh hold questioning'

People v. Gurule, Colo., 471 P.2d 413, 416

(1970).
In State v. Marks, Kan., 602 P.2d 1344 (1979), the
Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that where an officer don
not stop a moving vehicle, but merely approaches the defendant
sitting in a parked vehicle, there is no detention and hen~
no seizure.

In the present case there was also no "stoppi~'
-12-
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I

\

of the appellant and his companion since they were stationary
at the time when the Officer approached.

At the time that

officer Hansen arrived, it was reasonable that he take the
appellant avay from his companion and Office Levitre in order
to test the consistency of the information obtained by each
party.
If this Court finds that the conduct of the
officers constituted a "detention" or a "seizure" of the
~pellant,

it was justified under the "reasonable suspicion•

standard of Terry, supra.

Since Terry, most courts have

recognized that:
the governmental interest in
effective crime prevention underlies the
recognition that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for
investigating possible criminal behavior,
even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest.
People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P.2d 120, 123 (1975)
added).

(emphasis

See also State v. Post, Idaho, 573 P.2d 153 (1978) 1

State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125 (1977)1 United States v.
~.

598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979).

Thus, the Terry standard

of "reasonable suspicion" applies to detentions to investigate
possible criminal activity.
Furthermore, the cases cited by the appellant to
support his claim that his arrest was not based on probable
cause and therefore amounted to an unconstitutional seizure
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under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution!
do not apply to the circumstances of this case.

In Peoplev.

Miller, 496 P.2d 1228 (Cal. 1972), the California court wu
correct to determine that the mere presence of an individual
sleeping in his vehicle in a private parking lot did not gin
rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
However, in the present case the observations of Officer
Levitre which led him to make initial inquiries of the
defendant, coupled with the report of thefts in the vicinity,
were the bases of a reasonable suspicion of some criminal
activity.

This suspicion was further developed as he

questioned the appellant and his companion about the items
which were located in the back seat (T. 34, 130).

Lawful

questioning led to the information that the i terns were stolen
and at that time probable cause to arrest the appellant was
estasblished.

Thus, unlike the Miller case, the arrest was

not made without probable cause.
People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979), is also
distinguishable from the present case.

There it was

sufficient to establish probable cause that the appellant was
seen in a community with a high crime rate.

A general hi~

crime comrnuni ty is not analogous to an area in which several
l The Fourth Amendment is virtually identical to Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
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recent thefts have preceeded the issuance of directives to
increase police patrol and identify persons seen in the area
(T. 40, 43).

In State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127

(1977), this Court recognized that:

When a police officer sees or hears
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of
crime, he has not only the right but the
duty to make observations and
investigations to determine whether the
law is being violated; and if so, to take
such measures as are necessary in the
enforcement of the law.
Applying this standard, Officer Levitre had a duty to pursue
his initial observation of the appellant and Mr. Fulton to
insure that activity of a criminal nature was not occurring.
The fact that subsequent questioning provided information of a
recent theft indicates the legitimacy of the suspicion which
gave rise to a preliminary investigation.
In State v. Folkes, supra, this Court also
reiterated the test applied in Utah as to the propriety of
searches and seizures:
It is to be borne in mind that it is not
all searches and seizures without a
warrant which are proscribed by the
constitutional provisions referred to.
It is only of a search which is
•unreasonable.• It is commonly and
properly stated that the question as to
whether a search is unreasonable depends
upon the particular circumstances; and
the question to be answered is whether
reasonable and fair-minded persons would
judge the alleged search and seizure to
be unreasonable or oppressive.
-15-
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565 P.2d 1125, 1127.

When viewed in light of this test,

Officer Le Vi tre 's conduct in approaching and questioning the
appellant and his companion was not only "reasonable," but was
based on cumulative articulable facts giving him

reason~~

suspicion to believe that they were attempting to cover a
crime which had recently been committed.

The total

circumstances, the sudden turn of the car upon seeing the
patrol car (T. 29, 124), the lateness of the hour (T. 8), the
knowledge of recent reports of crime in the area with requests
to identify persons in the area ( T. 4 0, 4 3), and the failure
of the car to re-emerge from behind businesses which were
closed (T. 31, 127) distinguish this case from In re Tony

c,,

582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978) where no reasonable suspicion existed
to justify stopping the defendant.
The officer had a duty to make initial
investigations, and during questioning of the appellant and
his companion he discovered that the items located in the back
seat of the automobile were stolen.

At that point, there was

probable cause to arrest the appellant; thus his rights were
not violated by detaining him while Officer LeVi tre and his
companion went to the location where the i terns had been stolen
and returned with the owner, who identified the property as
his.

-16-
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Respondent agrees with appellant that the basic
standard for arrest without a warrant was set forth by the
united States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964).

This Court has adopted that standard in State v.

~·

27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972), wherein the

test is stated as fol lows:
The determination should be made on
an objective standard: whether from the
facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent
person in his position would be justified
in believing that the suspect had
committed the offense.
495 P.2d 1259, 1260.

See also State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d

129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972).

In addition, this Court has stated

often that the determination as to whether the arrest is based
on probable cause is primarily for the trial court and will
not be reversed on appeal unless c !early in error.

State v.

Eastmond, supra; State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976).
The trial court's determination that probable cause
existed prior to the time of the arrest and its denial of
appellant's motion to suppress should be affirmed (T. 86).
POINT II
THE SEIZURE OF THE ITEMS LOCATED IN THE
BACK OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS LAWFUL AND THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SUCH
SEIZED EVIDENCE.
-17-
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At trial appellant made a motion to suppress
evidence seized, claiming that the search of the automobile
was not incident to a valid arrest and that the subsequent
search and seizure was not based on exigent circumstances,
The trial court correctly denied this motion, finding that
there uas a valid arrest and thus probable cause existed ~
justify the search and seizure of the items located in the
automobile (See Appendix A)

(T. 83).

Appellant now contends that seizure of the evidence
at the police station without a warrant was in violation
his Fourth Amendment rights.

~

Respondent submits that the

seizure of the evidence occurred at the point that the
automobile was immobilized and that it was justified under
both the incident to a lawful arrest and automobile exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
In the present case, the initial "search" of the
automobile occurred when Officer Levitre saw the items (laUr
identified as stolen) in the back seat of the automobile.
This discovery was not a search within the constitutional
meaning of the term since it was within the plain view
exception to the search and seizure requirement.

State v.

Echevarrieta, supra.
The subsequent search and seizure of the evidence
after it had been identified by the owner was based on
probable cause and was effective from the time that the ~r

-18-
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was placed in custody.
a~

Here, the seizure of the automobile

its contents occurred after both parties were placed under

arrest.

Thus the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest.
The analysis justifying a search incident to lawful

0.rrest

is equally applicable to seizures which are incident to

a lawful arrest.

The propriety of a warrantless search

incident to a lawful arrest was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964).

This Court has also recognized this exception to the

general requirement of a warrant for conducting a search.
Eastmond, supra; State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 552 (1978).
The rationale of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42
(1972) is that there is no difference between seizing the car
at the scene and waiting for a search warrant and immediately
searching the car at the scene.

This applies equally to a

case like this one where the actual removal of the evidence is
done at the station but the legitimacy of the action is based
on the probable cause which existed incident to the arrest.
This Court has adopted the position that where a
vehicle retains a reasonable degree of mobility and officers
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband
or evidence of a crime, the search may be made immediately
without a warrant.

state v. Limb, Utah, 581 P.2d 142 (1978);

§.!..ate v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 (1972).
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In the present case, the officers knew that the
evidence was the fruit of crime as soon as it was identified
by the owner, and from that point they were justified in
seizing it to assure that it would be preserved.
The seizure of evidence was also justified under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

The

automobile exception was first recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267

u.s.

132

(1925}, where the Court stated:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the
government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a store, dwelling
house, or other structure in respect of
which a proper official warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a
ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought •
• • • The measure of legality of
such a seizure is, therefore, that the
seizing officer have reasonable or
probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has
contraband • • • therein • •
267

u.s.

132, 153-156.

At the point in time at which the

seizure of the evidence was made in this case, the seizing
officer knew that the evidence was stolen.
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Appellant's reliance on Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403

u.s.

443 (1971) is inappropriate here because on the facts

there the searching officers had no reason to believe the car
might contain contraband or evidence of crime when the search
a~

seizure occurred, whereas in this case the evidence had

been postively identified as fruits of crime and the seizure
~s

thus justified either as incident to the lawful arrest or

within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Therefore, the denial of the mot ion to suppress was proper.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH VALUE.
A.

APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
WAS NOT VIOLATED BY FAILURE TO
PRODUCE THE STOLEN TOOLS AT TRIAL.

Respondent does not contest appellant's basic
premise that the primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation is to allow the appellant the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

State

v, Manion, Utah, 57 p, 542 (1889).
In the present case this right was not abridged.
The appellant was allowed to, and did in fact, confront the
state's witness who testified as to value (T. 104-114).

The

appellant claims that without the actual presence of the tools
-21-
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he was unable to effectively test the credibility of the
owner's estimate of value.

This contention is not supported

by application of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,
The Sixth Amendment right carries with it the right
to have evidence presented only where that evidence is
essential to prove an element of the
Havas, Nevada, 6 01 P. 2d 119 7 ( 19 79) •

crim~,

as in State v.

Where the destruction of

the tools would not have precluded the state from presenting a
prima facie case, the analysis of the Havas case does not
apply.
The failure to produce the evidence in this case
was not prejudicial.

The appellant produced his own expert

witness, who testified as to the value of some of the items
(T. 216).

The trial court was, therefore, correct in

determining that there was sufficient evidence upon which the
jury could weigh the credibility of the owner's testimony as
contrasted to that of the appellant's expert witness (T. 157),
The appellant also concedes (Appellant's brief at
17) that the failure to produce the evidence does not fall
within the line of cases where the prosecution has
deliberately failed to produce material evidence (e.g. ~
v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975)).

In this case there

was no violation of any right essential to a fair trial.
Furthermore, the appellant could easily have remedied any
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1.

1

l

~rceived

inadequacy by issuing his own subpoena duces tecum

tT. 154) to the owner of the stolen property, Robby Ashby.

The failure to produce the tools may have been less
than expedient, but their absence did not prejudice the
appellant nor deny him his right to confront the witness
against him (Robby Ashby).

Therefore, the trial court was

correct in denying appellant's motion to dismiss.
B.

THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE VALUE OF PROPERTY
TAKEN BY APPELLANT EXCEEDED $1,000.

This Court has consistently held that the test to
determine the value of property stolen is the market value and
that the acceptance of the values testified to is a question
of fact which should be left to the jury.
Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977).

State v. Logan,

In State v. Harris, Utah, 519 P.2d

247 ( 1974), this Court found that:

Value is something at which the jury may
take a look.
The owner of an article is
competent to testify as to its value, and
such testimony is admissible, but neither
inviolate nor impervious to disbelief.
519 P. 2d at 248.

In the present case the trial court correctly
denied appellant's motion to dismiss, rejecting his contention
~at

the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
-23-
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...
sustain the motion.

The court determined that the owner of

the stolen property may testify as to its value

(~,

supra) and that the jury was free to accept or reject his
testimony (T. 89-120).
In order to find for the appellant on this point,
this Court would have to determine that a~l of the testim~y
as to value on the tools was improper.

Since an owner may

testify as to value, this contention is without merit.
Furthermore, the testimony of appellant's expert witness (T,
193-220) substantiated to a degree the testimony of the
state's witness.

However, the expert's testimony was not as

complete as the owner's in that he did not testify as to the
value of all items which were stolen (T. 216).

The value of

tools estimated by the owner at $1,300 (T. 94-100) was a
question of fact which was properly left to the jury.
From the decision of convict ion of second-degree
theft, it is apparent that the jury chose to believe the
testimony of the owner that the value of the stolen property
exceeded $1,000.
In State v. Whittenbeck, supra, this Court
sustained the conviction where the jury had relied on the
testimony of the owner of the laundromat which had been robbed
to determine that the value was in excess of $250.00.
Similarly, the jury's reliance on the owner's testimony of
value should be upheld in this case.
-24-
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1

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is apparent that
the conviction of the appellant for second-degree theft was
proper and that appellant's Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights
were not violated.

The conviction and sentence should

therefore be affirmed.
DATED this 29th day of December, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

~7JJ~~

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Peter
Stirba, Attorney for Appellant, McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN

&

CONDIE, 500 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84133,

this 29th day of December,
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:11

THE COURT: In this case based on the·, testimony

jl9 and the reasonable inferences from it, it involves many

120 facets of the law.
ll or not.

I don't know whether I' 11 cover them all

But in the first place you have

a

subjective test

22 as to probable cause for both arrest and seizure, search and

1

ll seizure.

In this case the hour is of some import.

Here you

i, 14 ave a parking area in a store complex with no thoroughfare
lS here through.
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So, you have the hour.

I think the testimony

2

was that the stores during the weekdays closed at 6:00

3

o'clock, and service stations and other things in that area,

4

or whatever it was, closed at 10:00.

5

parking area.

6
7

So, it is a private

And-any one of the public is an invitee for

the purposes of going there to the stores and the businesses
there in that area.

That's one factor.

8

Another factor is that the stores did not have

9

any security at that time, and due to the number of break-ins

lO

two days before a request had gone out for additional obser-

11

vations of the area by the police department, and that was

l2

reiterated on each shift~ - You have that factor.

13

evidence of any other vehicles in that area either on the

There's no

14 roadway or in the· parking area· or-- in the store area.
15

You've-got a police car that's clearly

16 marked coming down the street, and a car abruptly turning in.
17

So, at that point you've got police officer that knows of

18

lots of break-ins in that area at the time you've got an

19 abrupt turning.

You've got the public have no right in that

20

area as per se at that time.

21

police officer to determine why a vehicle would be in that

So, it's reasonable for a

22 area at that particular time.
23

You've got him after he sees the. vehicle go

24 in, back up so he can observe.

He sees it turn there

25 between the buildings, backs up so he can see whether it

~,- .7l~1,,
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I

exits.

Gives sufficient time for it to come through.

doesn't come through.

It

So, there is an assumption there that

the vehicle is still there.

So, he goes in to make inquiry.

The car is there with the hood up.

And to make inquiry as

to why they were there.·

i
'

6

According to one police officer I think thi.s
defendant did not have any identification as such.
other party did have that.

The

They were taken to respective

vehicles for further inquiry.

To separate them.

Then after

10 that because of the discrepancies in the explanations the
11 other person was--the other defendant was confronted.

And

11 an arrest still wasn't made at that time.

13

But when this defendant testifies he was

14 immediately placed under arrest for receiving or being in
l5 possession of stolen property, it is not a logical inference.

16 I can't believe him.

Because ·they did go down and observe

17 the vehicle that was described by the other defendant, which
18 indicated a break-in.

The owner of that property was taken

19 back to the scene, and the property, the stolen property,
20 the alleged stolen property in the back was in clearview.'
21 Even at the time that the officers first went up there it
11

was in clear view.

But it wasn ··t until they were informed

23 by the owner that that ·was stolen property that an arrest was
24 made.
25

So, the court w~uld find probable cause both

r
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in--they did not make arrest.

They further investigated,

2

which would be logical under the circumstances.

3

after it was determined that the property had been stolen,

4

and identified as stolen property, without any search.

5

was in plain view.

6

arrest.

7

are not entitled to the possession of that property.

It

It was at that time that they made the

And it would be at that time that the defendants

8
9

And then

So, at that point the Court would find that it
was a valid arrest,. that there was reasonable. and probable

10 ·cause to further investigate the case, to make a determina-

11

tion as to the suspicious circumstances that the defendant

12

was found in, and

13

validly made.

14

cause for search and seizure.

15

tha~

upon_ verification the_ arrests were

And at that time there would be a probable

Now, most of the cases on automobile--it's

16

true that based on probable cause and absent exigent circum-

17

stances that a search warrant should be obtained beforehand.

18

But, you see, most of those cases, if you follow them

19

through, you see, the property, which is subject matter of

20

the crime, is discovered by reason of the search.

21

great nwr.ber of cases justifr search without warrant on the

22

basis that products can be easily removed from a vehicle,

23

disposed of, or moved to another locale.

24

cases, that is where you make the search and then discover

25

the fruits of the crime.

And a

But most of those
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In this case the fruits of the crime are
apparent from the first observation.
3

But at that time they

were not aware that they were fruits of a crime.

4

So, it's not something that they discover
incident to the arrest or incident to the seizure.

-

So, in

this case it is preliminary investigation determination that
the crime had actually been committed, the fruits of the
crime in clear view had never been seized prior to the
arrest. And after the arrest there was nothing gained,
10 no knowledge, anything else gained by incident of the seizure
11
of the goods. ·
12

So, the only question is here that remains,

13

as I view it, is after they take possession of the vehicle,

14

and take it to the police station, and remove--at the time

15

they got to the police station remove the fruits of the

16

crime from the car itself.

17

United States Supreme Court on that.

18
19

20
21
I

22

!

ll
1ll
1
1

And I'm willing to go with the

21

The facts are not too important, but in Fran.k
Chambers vs. James F. Maroney, 26 Law Edition 2d 419, and
27 Law Edition 2d 94, if I remember right, that was a--·

there's only one point in this that's of material import to
this case.

It involves three points that went up to the

United States Supreme court on certiorari, and the majority
opinion, which was Justice White, was supported by s~ven
rerr.bers of the court.

The pertinent point here H; the search
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,I,, <"'
the

car

of the car did not violate the petitioner's Constitutional
2
3
4

5
6

7

8
9
· 10

11
12

13
14

rights.

They had probable cause for stopping and then

search.

And they addressed themselves specifically to when

the car was seized and the contents thereof.

17
18

19

20

I

crime were removed from the car.

based

However, it. :,t crime

was taken to the police station before th.e fruits of the

searcb

',~

\,

That's the pertinent point \'

'\t

diffe

held it's not unreasonable for police officers to take an

~

start

automopile to a police station before making a warrantless

~

in this .case that the· Court relies on.

search of the automobile.

And in that they

But this isn't a search.

another distinguishing factor in this.

That's

It is not a search
.

As I've indicated before.

in that sense.

Here's your cases back, both of you.

The

distinguishing part, I believe it's our California case.
Yeah.

This is your case here.

The distin-

guishing parts, your fact situation are not the same in your
California case.

You see, it wasn't a question of your

first observation of criminal behavior.

I would agree with

21

you if the Court found that the arrest was made on that

22

basis.

23

California case.

I would certainly agree with you.

Under your

But in this case certainly inquiry as to

24 why they were in that area would be appropriate, which was
25 not the case in your California case.

the

It's a seizure.

suppress is denied.

Where's that?

p.m.

-

Your motion to

And it's a seizure of contraband goods.

15

Hi

in ord

He was fo_und asleep
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not

I

• t1

in the parking area.

An arrest was made and they searched

the car and got electronic equipment from the car.

11

In this case certainly inquiry was a necessity
' in order to determine why they would be in that area.

en

I based

.

11

'I

And

on that inquiry they further made inquiry as to the

crime itself.

I
'

I

I

Nothing was discovered by reason of that

1~ search.

I

But the fact situation this Court feels is

nt :'
I

' different than the one in your California case.

~

We' 11

start trial at 2: 00 o'clock.
. (Thereupon, Court was held in recess at 12:45

'
I

p.m. and reconvened at 2: 00 o'clock p.rn. in the afternoon of
the same day.)
THE COURT:
not here'?

Is there still one juror who's

Who is i t7
THE CLERK:

Douros.

THE COURT:

Pull his card, then.

I'll want

to speak to him as to why he isn't here.
Ordinarily we start a jury trial at 10:00
o'clock and go until 12:00, and then recess until 2:00 and
go until 5:00.

You were called for 11:00 o'clock this

morning because of some matters of law that had to be taken
up prior to the start of this trial.

bit longer than we anticipated..

And it took a little

But we had you stay around

because, hopefully, we could have selected the·:jury,. and

1
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